By Peter J Brown, Asia Times Online Apr 22, 2010
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LD22Ad01.html
In mid-April, two Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers, the Choukai and Suzunami, unexpectedly encountered several Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships, including a pair of submarines and eight destroyers, approximately 140 kilometers west-southwest of Okinawa near the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands. The Chinese warships were heading out of the East China Sea and into the Western Pacific. They passed north of Miyako Island - the northernmost island in the Nansei group - through the Miyako Strait and then proceeded to head southeast.
China is seeking to project its blue-water forces from the Middle East to Pacific shipping lanes, in a buildup that has surprised foreign military officials.
They were
there to practice anti-submarine warfare, underway refueling and helicopter
flight training, to name a few of the procedures.
During one PLAN helicopter flight, the Suzunami was subjected to a close
encounter which prompted a formal protest by Japan's SDF Joint Staff Office. The
presence of the PLAN subs also sparked a protest.
Japan's Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi was upset that so many Chinese
warships had sailed so near to Japan on their way to the western Pacific Ocean
without any prior notification by China. [1]
Kitazawa said nothing about whether or not any of the five new Chinese earth
observation/military reconnaissance satellites launched since late 2009 were
engaged in assisting the PLAN warships during their unannounced passage.
Gary Li, a PLA specialist at the London-based Institute of International and
Strategic Studies (IISS) said the PLAN's actions in this instance were very
significant. Li describes the incident as unprecedented and an attempt by China
to "send a very clear message to the region that it should be prepared to see a
China unafraid to really test its reach and move into new areas". [2]
Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC,
did not agree with Li, adding that the recent PLAN "blue water" activity off
Japan did not prove that the PLAN has entered a disturbing new phase in its
development.
"Calling this a new phase is overly dramatic. The PLA has been working for a
long time on expanding their ability to operate farther from their shores and
conduct joint operations closely coordinating air, land and sea platforms," said
Thompson. "These PLAN exercises certainly demonstrate expanded capabilities, or
at least the willingness to exercise the hardware they have more vigorously, but
it should be viewed as part of a continuum rather than a departure from a
previous period of development."
Certainly, it is not getting any easier for the US and the rest of
Asia to
determine where exactly China is heading and what China's exact intentions are.
"Reports of a transit by the PLAN forces close to Okinawa only remind US allies
in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific, that China's future course is
unclear," said Abraham Denmark, a fellow at the Center for a New American
Security in Washington, DC. "It is important to retain a military hedge against
the possibility that China could become confrontational and militarily
aggressive."
The PLAN has long been charged with two primary tasks: defending the mainland
and operations related to a Taiwan contingency, which would primarily involve
anti-access/area denial operations in the Western Pacific, according to Denmark.
This exercise may be further evidence of the growing emphasis placed by the PLAN
on protecting vital so-called "Sea Lines of Communication" (SLOCs). Chinese
President Hu Jintao has referred to this role as one of the PLA's "new historic
missions".
"China's leaders have slowly come to recognize that its continued economic
development relies on access to foreign resources and markets. For example, 80%
of China's oil imports flow through the Strait of Malacca, yet the PLAN
currently does not have the capability to protect Chinese vessels far from
home," said Denmark. "This has made China's military leaders begin to examine a
third role for the PLAN, which would entail SLOC protection."
Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based International
Assessment and Strategy Center, described this recent East China Sea exercise by
the PLAN as representing "a significant step in reaping the past decade's
investments".
"The PLAN deployed at least two small multi-platform surface action groups to
include submarines, long-range anti-air defenses, logistic support ships,
supported by new long-range ground based and space-based surveillance, and
reportedly, significant ground-based air," said Fisher. "This was a multi-fleet
operation that reportedly involved Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]
aircraft and fighters, which if true would constitute a major expansion of the
PLAN's operational capabilities."
For Taiwan and for any US forces that may have to break a future PLAN blockade,
the message is clear.
"In a decade, there could be two carriers, larger destroyers, and, even ship-
and submarine-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles [ASBMs] in the mix. Absent a
sustained investment by the US and Japan in space defenses, naval energy weapons
to counter ASBMs, plus their own, and, fifth and sixth generation fighters for
air force and naval deployment, they will lose maritime dominance in the Western
Pacific by the mid-2020s," said Fisher. "These investments are less likely as
long as Washington and Tokyo remain transfixed by the mirage that Beijing will
become their 'pivotal partner' in meeting future challenges, they simply want to
ignore the fact that it is China which is the challenge."
As for the role of space assets and space defense-related issues, they have
slipped under the radar in large part thus far. What is unfolding overhead in
support of any or all of the PLAN operations may be the most significant aspect
of this recent Chinese war gaming in the Western Pacific. In fact, absent
evidence to the contrary, the presence aloft of so many new Chinese earth
observation/military reconnaissance satellites is what sets this exercise apart
from all previous PLAN exercises.
According to Associate Professor Andrew Erickson with the China Maritime Studies
Institute at the US Naval War College, China is rapidly improving its
increasingly diverse network of space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors in support of military land, sea and air
operations.
"Synthetic Aperture Radar [SAR] in particular offers wide coverage at sufficient
resolution. Maritime surveillance, prioritized at the national level under
China's 863 State High-Technology Development Plan, is receiving significant
funding," said Erickson.
Over the past decade, China has launched two Haiyang (Ocean) maritime
observation satellites, and a third is now scheduled for launch this year after
its original launch date in 2009 was scratched. In addition, China's has
recently expanded its fleet of Yaogan satellites, which China describes as
merely engaging in civilian earth observation missions. However, many experts
identify them as dual role, military reconnaissance satellites. The Yaogans
carry a mix of optical as well as radar-based sensors.
"Of particular note are the five Yaogan satellites that China has launched in
the past five months. Yaogan 7 and 8 were launched in December. Yaogan 7 is
optical and Yaogan 8 appears to be equipped with SAR," said Erickson. "Yaogan
9A, 9B, and 9C, launched in March, share the same orbit, suggesting that they
have a special mission to perform."
Interestingly, when the official announcement was made by China's Xinhua news
agency of the pending Yaogan 9 launch - a day before it took place as is the
custom whenever secret Chinese military payloads in particular are ready to go
up - Xinhua reported that a large satellite, and not a payload consisting of
three smaller formation-flying satellites, was sitting on the launch pad. [3]
All of these Chinese satellites, together with China's development of
ground-based over-the-horizon radars, suggests that China is developing
unprecedented capability to monitor and conduct operations along its disputed
maritime periphery, according to Erickson. He marks this exercise as proof
positive that the PLAN is now finally and fully prepared to meet strategic goals
originally articulated by Admiral Liu Huaqing, who headed the PLAN from 1982 to
1988. In effect, PLAN is now starting to conduct "far seas operations" beyond
the so-called "First Island Chain".
US Navy Admiral Robert Willard commands the US Pacific Fleet. His testimony in
March that China is "developing and testing" an ASBM only adds to the sense that
China is fast assembling a far more formidable naval force.
"Such PLAN operations at increasing range from China's shores are
ever-better-supported by improving satellite-based communications, positioning,
and surveillance capabilities," said Erickson. "Unprecedented and innovative use
of satellite communications has been a major highlight of China's counter-piracy
deployments in the Gulf of Aden; there the PLAN apparently relied solely on
indigenous capabilities for the first time. While US and most Western [as well
as the former Soviet] navies have engaged in related operations for years, this
was a new and important step for the PLAN."
In advance of the PLAN's December 2008 deployment to the Gulf of Aden, PLAN
commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, and PLAN political commissar, Admiral Liu
Xiaojiang, demanded "comprehensive coverage, all-time linkage, and full-course
support".
The PLAN's newspaper, People's Navy, reported that the PLAN Political Department
worked with the PLAN Headquarters Communications Department and the State
Information Center to improve a platform that:
[I]ntegrates a land base information collection and transmission system, an information integration and distribution system, a shore-to-ship information wireless transmission system, and an information terminal receiving system. They also sent technical personnel to Sanya [on Hainan Island] to conduct satellite receiving equipment debugging, system installation, and personnel training on the three combat ships that were about to set sail for escort operations. Moreover, they specially developed and improved a total of seven information processing software programs, which can send text, images, as well as video and audio documents quickly.
Satellite-based navigation and positioning via China's Beidou-1, currently a
4-satellite constellation, has very limited range and can support
ship-positioning on China's immediate maritime periphery, but not further
afield.
"It could not be used [during a missile attack] for short-range precision
guidance because it is too slow, allowing for insufficient information [flow]
during a missile's relatively short flight time," said Erickson "In part to
support broader operations, China is deploying a 35-satellite Beidou-2/Compass
system that would provide much improved accuracy, with regional navigation and
communications coverage anticipated by 2011 and global navigation coverage by
2015-20. Three Compass satellites have been launched thus far."
While the PLAN is gradually increasing focus on areas beyond mainland China,
this is part of a two-level process - Erickson refers to a "tale of two navies"
- with nearby priorities still at the core.
"Preparing to defend China's territorial and maritime claims by asymmetric means
is likely to remain the PLAN's focus for the foreseeable future, even as it
pursues secondarily lower intensity missions further afield," said Erickson
"China's capabilities are clearly growing, but its naval intentions - at least
beyond asserting control over its claimed territorial waters, to include Taiwan
- are somewhat unclear."
Fisher finds no lack of clarity, however, when it comes to the steady
progression in the core Chinese military strategy including its military space
strategy which reinforces the PLAN's operational prowess at every turn.
"The PLAN's first requirement for regional and global projection is dominance of
the Low Earth Orbit theater of operations. We know that this is now a very high
priority for the PLA, not just to enable an array of PLAN weapons," said Fisher.
"The PLAN will eventually field anti-satellite weapons, other space combat
capabilities, and, submarine and ship - launched ASBMs."
Fisher identifies submarines as the second major PLAN program of global
importance.
"These will be much quieter, and improved versions may allow the beginning of
independent deep water ballistic missile-equipped submarine operations."
A third program is the construction of as many as four aircraft carrier and
large amphibious ship battle groups by the late 2020s.
"There is also a fourth essential program, the PLA's ability to sell world class
naval and other military technologies, which together with commercial
envelopment, forms core strategic relationships that will yield maritime
alliances," Fisher said.
Denmark cautions that whatever conclusions are drawn, there is no question that
PLAN still has a long way to go before it can be classified as a formidable
"blue water" naval force.
"The PLAN currently does not have the experience required to operate for
extended periods of time far from home, nor does it have sufficient numbers of
ships to be able to operate in the Indian Ocean without significantly
diminishing its ability to respond to threats closer to home," said Denmark.
"Moreover, the PLA is traditionally dominated by leaders with experience in
ground operations, and significant doctrinal and conceptual changes will have to
take place within the PLA before the PLAN would be able to protect SLOCs."
Despite the Gulf of Aden missions to date, SLOC protection, specifically in the
Indian Ocean, remains very challenging for the PLAN.
"China has no military bases in the Indian Ocean, and its ships conducting
counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia are primarily supported by
oilers from China. If the PLAN develops the capability to establish a regular
presence in the Indian Ocean, such a force would either be dependent on
logistical ships transiting back and forth through Indonesia or on a network of
regional support bases or ports," said Denmark. "While much has been written
about Chinese involvement in port development in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma
[Myanmar], these ports appear to be commercial only. Still, it is conceivable
that the PLAN could use commercial ports in the Indian Ocean, especially in
friendly countries, for logistical support during peacetime."
Whether the five new Chinese satellites launched since late 2009 may have been
tasked to assist the PLAN warships during their April exercise far from the
shores of China remains open to question. However, there is no denying that
those same satellites were still stuck on the ground the last time any prior
large-scale PLAN exercises took place in the same vicinity.
Notes
1.
Chinese submarines, destroyers spotted in high seas near Okinawa (from South
China Morning Post), JapanToday, Apr 13, 2010.
2. Exercises off Japan and Taiwan show PLA navy's new prowess, IISS, Apr 18,
2010.
3.
China to launch Yaogan IX remote-sensing satellite, Xinhua, Mar 4, 2010.
Peter J Brown is a satellite journalist from Maine USA.
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Japan rejects China's excuse over naval fly-by
(AFP) April 23, 2010
TOKYO ¡X Japan Friday rejected China's claim that two incidents in which a helicopter from a Chinese naval flotilla flew close to a Japanese destroyer this month were "necessary defence measures".
The statement follows Tokyo's protests to Beijing over the incidents, which took place off Japan's southern Okinawa island chain on April 8 and Wednesday.
The Chinese flotilla -- including two submarines and eight other ships -- was the largest group of Chinese warships monitored in the region, according to Japan's defence ministry.
In response to Japan's protests, China replied late Thursday that the helicopter manoeuvres were a "necessary defence measure against Japan's warning and surveillance activities," Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa told reporters.
"Even though the incidents took place on the high seas, it was extremely dangerous. So we filed a stern protest (again) through diplomatic channels," Kitazawa said.
"Both sides should act in a way to prevent any accident."
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said later: "We listened to the Chinese explanation and we were not necessarily convinced by it."
He added that Japan's surveillance activities were "not something dangerous or illegal. We must exchange views seriously on this matter."
According to Japan's defence ministry, the sea-borne helicopter approached the Japanese destroyer Asayuki some 500 kilometres (300 miles) south of the main Okinawan island in the latest incident.
The helicopter flew at an altitude as low as 50 metres (165 feet) and twice flew around the destroyer, approaching as close as 90 metres (295 feet).
Between April 7 and 9, the Chinese fleet conducted drills in the East China Sea near Okinawa and then moved to the Pacific Ocean on April 10, Kyodo news agency said, quoting Japanese government officials.
In recent years, the Chinese navy has sent its fleets to the Pacific Ocean via the waters near Okinawa, it added
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Japan increasingly
alarmed by China's growing naval power
By Jonathan Manthorpe, Vancouver Sun April 21, 2010
Warships off Okinawa and other incidents with an increasingly far-roaming and
competent Chinese navy likely a harbinger of shocks to come
Tokyo's shock, horror and alarm at the sighting a few days ago of a flotilla of
10 Chinese warships off Japan's southern Okinawa island is undoubtedly
contrived.
It has been evident for the past two decades as it invested huge amounts of
money, time and effort into military modernization that Beijing intends to be
able to project military power that supports its growing economic and diplomatic
supremacy.
Just a few days before the latest encounter, a helicopter from a Chinese warship
"buzzed" a Japanese naval vessel that was keeping watch on the exercises.
And in the past few years there have been other incidents with an increasingly
far-roaming and competent Chinese navy.
Last year a Chinese submarine collided with the sonar gear being trailed by the
American ship USS John S. McCain near the Philippines.
In 2006 an undetected Chinese submarine surfaced within firing range of the
aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk.
Indeed, the joint exercise 10 days ago off Japan involving two Chinese
Kilo-class nuclear-powered submarines and eight surface warships, including two
missile-armed destroyers and three frigates, is a harbinger of shocks yet to
come.
This flotilla and its exercise to perfect coordinated actions at sea have the
hallmarks of training the battle groups that will be necessary to protect
China's coming fleet of aircraft carriers.
Beijing has decided that although aircraft carriers and their defending battle
groups are difficult to operate effectively, they are such a potent and visible
demonstration of the ability to project military power and enforce political
will that China must have them.
China's first aircraft carrier is expected by western military analysts to come
into service in 2015. By 2020 Beijing may have in its navy half a dozen carriers
armed with the latest ground-attack and air supremacy fighter aircraft.
China's development of a blue water, high seas navy on what was little more than
a few coastal gunboats two decades ago has been a brilliant piece of
gamesmanship.
Beijing, quite rightly, felt it necessary to keep its neighbours and Washington
-- whose navy has been the guarantor of Asian security for more than 60 years --
guessing about its activities and intentions.
While China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and associated military agencies
have been given budgets with annual double-digit increases with which to buy,
develop or steal the most modern military equipment available, Beijing has
publicly insisted it is intent upon a "peaceful rise."
Only recently, now that it has a fleet of upwards of 60 submarines and the
confidence to assert itself on the world stage, has Beijing started showing the
teeth behind its smile.
Despite its efforts at obfuscation, Beijing's evident determination to build and
operate a navy capable of projecting power throughout Asia has worried China's
neighbours.
It has prompted an arms race in Asia, especially with the acquisition by China's
neighbours of submarines, which because of their stealth and multiple weapons
systems offer great deterrent value.
India, which sees itself as Beijing's main regional rival, is pursuing a massive
naval expansion and modernization program designed to keep ahead of China.
Australia is doubling its submarine fleet to 12. Malaysia, Vietnam, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Singapore, Indonesia and South Korea are all in the process of
acquiring or expanding their submarine fleets.
Without any apparent appreciation of the irony, Chinese military officers and
associated academics have been warning at regional defence conferences in recent
weeks that this arms race, especially the widespread acquisition of submarines,
is inherently destabilizing in Asia.
A succinct picture of what is driving Asian governments to beef up their
submarine fleets came earlier this month when, with more irony, Senior Colonel
Chen Zhou, a researcher with the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences, was trying
to assuage the concerns among the governments of the 10-member Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
"ASEAN countries should be assured that China's development of its navy is only
to maintain the country's own maritime interests and regional peace and
stability," Chen said.
Well, since Beijing's claimed "maritime interests" include disputes with
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Indonesia over the ownership of
islands and submarine resources in the South China Sea, that was hardly
reassuring.
http://www.vancouversun.com/opinion/Japan+increasingly+alarmed+China+growing+naval+power/2933066/story.html
Chinese Navy expanding role / Government to closely monitor
activities in areas around Japan
Apr. 15, 2010
The government believes the Chinese fleet that sailed between Okinawa Island and
Miyakojima island last week indicated once again that the Chinese Navy is
increasing its efforts to expand the range of its operations.
On Saturday, a fleet of 10 Chinese vessels, including two submarines, was
spotted in international waters sailing between the two islands.
As a result, the government is closely monitoring China's maritime activities in
the area.
In the PLA Daily, the Chinese People's Liberation Army described the navy's
latest action as an exercise designed to deploy its warships in distant waters.
According to the Self-Defense Forces' Joint Staff Office, five Chinese naval
ships, including frigates, took part in an exercise in the East China Sea from
Wednesday to Friday last week. On Thursday, a Chinese carrier-based helicopter
came within about 90 meters of two Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers.
The Joint Staff Office fears the Chinese might have been engaged in spying
activities or an act of provocation as a Chinese in the helicopter was seen
pointing a camera at an MSDF ship.
MSDF Chief of Staff Keiji Akahoshi said Tuesday that the helicopter posed a
danger to some extent.
The Defense Ministry on Monday asked China through diplomatic channels to
explain its actions as safe navigation could be endangered.
Also worrying to the government was that the submarines, which normally travel
submerged, were on the surface as the fleet sailed between Okinawa Island and
Miyakojima.
A government source said the Chinese naval forces have increased their potential
by expanding their training area, with the aim of preventing any intervention by
the naval forces of the United States or other nations if a contingency arose in
the Taiwan Strait.
"The maneuver shows that China has to a large degree put into force a defense
strategy off its coastal waters," said Tetsuo Kotani, a researcher at the Ocean
Policy Research Foundation.
The government will only monitor Chinese naval activities for now because
sailing and carrying out training exercises in international waters does not
violate international law. At a press conference Monday, Chief Cabinet Secretary
Hirofumi Hirano said, "Announcing the naval maneuvers sends a strong message to
China that the activities of its naval vessels will be closely monitored by the
Japanese government."
However, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said the impact of the fleet's
movements on the bilateral relationship between the two countries would be
"limited."
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada also stopped short of making any clear comments
on the situation at Monday's press conference. "I wouldn't like to make any
comment until I fully confirm all the facts," he said.
The Yomiuri Shimbun http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20100415TDY02T03.htm
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