Citizenship, economy and social exclusion of Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong
Journal of Contemporary Asia May 1, 2006
Lee Kim-ming
"We asked for workers but human beings came.'" Max Frisch (quoted in Hollifield,
2000: 149)
In May 1999, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government
requested a reinterpretation of certain provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law
from China's National People's Congress in order to prevent a flood of
immigration of Chinese children born to Hong Kong people. The reinterpretation
of the Basic Law stirred up great contention within Hong Kong about the legal
system and the autonomy of Hong Kong governance. But this controversy of the
right of abode (ROA) is not purely an issue of "constitutional crisis," More
seriously, it is an indication of social exclusion that has been constituting
and reconstituting Hong Kong society since the late 1970s.
Hong Kong is often viewed as a society of Chinese immigrants. Why, then, could
the early migrants be easily included into Hong Kong society, but not the later
migrants? (2) In this article, the social exclusion of the "new" Chinese
immigrants is discussed in three interrelated dimensions. First, given that an
economy, at different developmental stages, demands different types of human
resources; any viable economic strategy to boost or transform the local economy
cannot ignore the composition of different types of human capital embodied in
the local population. As economic globalisation has triggered intense rivalry
among cities in terms of becoming the commanding and coordinating nodes of the
global economy, these global cities are undergoing economic restructuring that
creates what commentators call "dual cities" or "divided cities" (Mollenkopf and
Castells, 1991; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe, 1992) in which social, political,
and economic polarisation are very serious. Accompanying economic globalisation
are the massive waves of migration of people, skilled and unskilled labour,
professionals, and others, from economically backward places to these cities.
However, not all migrants are considered valuable for the "importing" countries,
depending on the economic strategies the countries are employing. Under global
restructuring, low-skilled migrants are often considered as a burden to the host
society and as competitors of the local working class people. All these
precipitate the social exclusion of these migrants.
Second, the political attempts of territorial states to establish their own
legitimacy and build up their governing capacity are major catalysts that induce
the social exclusion of immigrants. Migrants or minority groups often become
scapegoats responsible for a state's failure to boost the local economy as well
as its failure to resolve increasing social and political problems. In addition,
migrants are also "victimised" when they become the focus of political debates,
especially those concerned with immigration policies, among different political
groups competing for power. These political debates inevitably stereotype new
immigrants, and the media very often helps promote the biased images.
Third, the nature and strength of local place-based social identity or
citizenship determines how difficult it is for the new immigrants to be included
in the host society. In general, the stronger and more homogeneous the local
identity is, the more likely that the new immigrants are socially excluded.
However, social identity is often formed with references to other groups,
foreign and local, in everyday life. As a result, the local economic conditions
as well as state policies, which affect people's life world, inevitably, shape
the local social identity that may inhibit new immigrants to be included in the
local society.
The article is divided into four sections. The first part will briefly recount
the history of Chinese immigration. The second part will describe the profile of
recent immigrants. The third section is about the relationships between Hong
Kong's economic development and the state's immigration policies, while the
final section will discuss how Hong Kong's state policies helped form a
particular Hong Kong identity vis-a-vis Chinese. These two sections aim at
drawing out the mechanisms that determine the social exclusion of the new
immigrants since the 1990s.
A Brief History of Chinese Immigration to Hong Kong
Hong Kong is a unique immigrant society made up of several waves of migration.
When Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842, it was essentially a small
fishing village, with a local population of no more than a few thousand. Since
neither the Chinese government nor the British colonial government limited
population mobility across the China border, free migration from China, mainly
from villages in South China, occurred whenever there was political and social
unrest in China. The first wave of refugees was caused by the Taiping uprising
in the early 1850s. The second wave occurred during the 1911 Revolution. The
third wave happened in 1938, when the Japanese attacked Guangdong. After the
Second World War, the first big wave of immigration occurred, around the period
during which the Communists took over China (Podmore, 1971 : 23-5).
The Hong Kong population was around 500,000 to 600,000 in 1945. It jumped to
1,168,000 in 1946 and reached 2,050,000 in 1953 (Szczepanik, 1958: 153). This
huge increase in population created serious shortages of housing, food,
clothing, and other necessities. As a result, a stricter immigration policy was
implemented. When the Immigration Control Ordinance of 1949 was put into effect,
entrants had to possess valid documents, and the Ordinance criminalised
non-compliance. The control on immigrants was supplemented by another
regulation, the Registration of Persons Ordinance of 1949. The Registration
introduced a comprehensive system of registration for all persons who resided in
the territory, exempting only travellers in transit and children under 12 years
old. It also regulated the introduction of identity cards and requested all of
the adult population to register. However, these measures had little effect on
the huge influx of immigrants crossing over the border since the Chinese
authorities provided no legal control on, and appeared to encourage, the
immigrants that poured into Hong Kong in the early 1950s (Destexhe, 1995: 25-6).
In May 1950, the colonial government implemented a quota system to restrict the
entry of Chinese citizens. But the effectiveness of the system depended upon the
willingness of the Chinese authorities to limit the exit of the migrants. After
negotiation, the Chinese and British government reached an agreement. The
Chinese government would decide on the number of entrants to be allowed to enter
Hong Kong from China and would vet and approve the applications for entry into
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong colonial government would accept all Chinese citizens
who had been issued exit permits, the so-called "One-Way Permit" (OWP), by the
Chinese government for entry into Hong Kong for residence. However, in
recognition of Hong Kong's population pressure, the Chinese government would
restrict the number of people granted exit permits. With the exception of two
brief periods of suspension in 1955 and 1956, this quota system has continued
until today (Lam and Liu 1998: 9).
In the early 1960s, another wave of immigration happened. China's Great Leap
Forward and the collectivisation movement in agriculture during the late 1950s
led to widespread starvation. Consequently, a large number of immigrants who did
not have valid exit permits issued by the Chinese authorities, illegally fled to
Hong Kong. This was the first wave of illegal immigration from China into Hong
Kong since the imposition of immigration control by quota in 1950. From the
1960s onwards, until the 1980s, immigration was mainly illegal because Chinese
had great difficulty obtaining exit permits, especially after the beginning of
the Cultural Revolution (Lam and Liu 1998: 9-11). Even with the large inflow of
illegal immigrants, Podmore (1971: 25) has contended that Hong Kong's population
increase was mainly due to natural causes rather than immigration. According to
the 1961 Census Report and the 1966 By-Census Report, the proportion of the
population born within Hong Kong in 1921, 1931, 1961, and 1966 were 26.7%,
32.5%, 47.7%, and 53.8%, respectively (Podmore, 1971: 37). These figures show
that by the 1960s, Hong Kong had become a more localised society, with more than
half the population locally-born.
As will be discussed, although the natural increase rate was quite high between
1950 and 1970, there was still a serious shortage of unskilled labour because of
rapid labour-intensive industrialisation. Though the state indeed policed the
Chinese border to reduce illegal immigration, the government exercised
discretion in allowing these illegal immigrants to register and stay in Hong
Kong whether they had been apprehended by the police or not. As Destexhe (1995:
28) remarks, "Hong Kong's model for discretionary immigration control resembles
that of countries which do not officially admit that they take worker migrants,
but do so in practice." Nonetheless, the control was tightened from 1974
onwards. The Hong Kong state discontinued its actual practice of allowing all
Chinese immigrants to stay in Hong Kong and replaced it with the "TouchBase
Policy" in 1974. According to new policy, those arrested illegal immigrants were
repatriated to China and those who successfully evaded capture and subsequently
established a home with relatives or found accommodation in urban areas (i.e.
"touched base") were allowed to stay (Lain and Liu 1998: 13).
The "Touch-Base Policy" finally came to an end when China adopted the "OpenDoor"
policy in 1978. China's economic reform gradually eroded social and political
controls at the local level, especially through the relaxation of the household
registration (hukou) system, thus making population movement easier (Siu 1996:
340). Consequently, Hong Kong was again bombarded by an onslaught of illegal
immigration that was even more massive than the one in the early 1960s. The
state recognised that the existing immigration policy could no longer control
the influx. Thus the Hong Kong state announced the abolition of the Touch-Base
Policy on 23 October 1980; all illegal immigrants were subject to repatriation
(Lam and Liu 1998: 14-5). Besides, the Immigration Ordinance was amended with
urgency on the same date of the announcement. The amended Ordinance required all
people residing in Hong Kong to carry identity cards or some other acceptable
proof of identification at all times, otherwise, a maximum fine of HK$1,000
would be levied. Moreover, the new law also imposed heavy fines, the maximum of
which was HK$50,000 or imprisonment for one year, on employers who hired illegal
immigrants (Destexhe 1995: 29). Accompanying the amendment of the Ordinance, the
Hong Kong government and the Chinese government reached an agreement to restrict
the issuance of OWP to 150 a day. This daily quota was subsequently revised
downwards to 75 in 1983 and remained the same for ten years (Lam and Liu 1998:
16-7).
After the abolition of the Touch-Base Policy, the only way for Chinese to
migrate to Hong Kong was to obtain the OWP. Even so, it remained common for
illegal immigrants to cross the border. There are two forms of illegal
immigrants. Besides OWP, the Chinese authorities can issue an unlimited number
of Two-Way Permits (TWP), which allow holders to visit Hong Kong for the purpose
of visiting family or doing business but require that they return to China after
a designated period. However, the two-way permit system creates a loophole for
illegal immigration. There are numerous overstayers. For instance, in 1991 there
were 22,566 Chinese, 5% of which were TWP holders who overstayed. Many of the
female overstayers aimed at giving birth in Hong Kong so that their children
would be Hong Kong residents. Another mode of illegal immigration is the illegal
entry by sneaking into the territory by land or by sea. Although the Hong Kong
government has tightened border control since the 1980s, many illegal immigrants
were successfully smuggled into Hong Kong by well-organised criminal networks to
labour in construction sites, factories, and service establishments like
eateries (Kwong, 1993:169).
The problem of immigration through illegal entry, which can be approximated by
the declining figures of the number of illegal immigrants arrested as shown in
Table 1, has been greatly reduced in the 1990s. In the 1990s and 2000s, the most
hotly debated issues concerning immigration are the labour importation policies
and the ROA of spouses and children of Hong Kong residents who stay in China.
Hong Kong's labour importation policies can be dated back to the late 1980s and
early 1990s when Hong Kong experienced acute labour shortages in many sectors.
The General Labour Importation Scheme was introduced in 1989 on the basis of an
industry quota system. In light of the rise in the unemployment rate the
government terminated the General Scheme in October 1995 and replaced it with
the Supplementary Labour Scheme. But in July 1990, the Special Labour
Importation Scheme was introduced to facilitate the timely completion of the new
airport. These labour importation policies, though welcomed by business, have
been condemned by labour interest groups for creating unemployment among Hong
Kong's workers as well as lowering the wages.
Although about 60% of Hong Kong's population is locally born, as an immigrant
society, many Hong Kong residents have family ties in China. Indeed, most legal
immigrants and overstayers come to Hong Kong for family reunion. The large
number of overstayers is basically caused by the daily OWP quota system. The
processing of applications for OWP has been poorly managed by the Chinese
authorities: corruption has been widely reported; eligibility criteria are not
applied consistently; and some eligible applicants have to wait for a very long
time for approval. Most importantly, the Chinese authorities treat applicants
individually rather than treating a family as a whole. As a result, there have
been many young children being issued OWE but not their mothers. This creates
numerous single-parent families, and defeats the purpose of family reunion (Lam
and Liu 1998: 29-34).
Dreams of family reunion were greatly stimulated by the Chinese annexation of
Hong Kong in 1997. According to the Basic Law (Hong Kong's constitutional
document), Article 24 para 2(3), children of permanent Hong Kong residents have
the right of abode in the SAR. Just after the annexation ceremony, a number of
children of permanent Hong Kong residents who "illegally" stayed in Hong Kong
went to the Immigration office to claim their ROA. As a result, on 9 July 1997,
the Provisional Legislative Council quickly amended the Immigration Ordinance in
a way that Chinese are required to hold OWPs, which are issued by the Chinese
authorities, before they could exercise their ROA in Hong Kong. As for children
born in China to the people of Hong Kong, one of their parents must be a Hong
Kong permanent resident at the time of the birth. The amendment made a lot of
ROA claimants who had "illegally" re-united with their families confront the
fate of repatriation to China.
After numerous ROA court cases, on 29 January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal
(CFA) gave a landmark judgement that these Chinese claimants were eligible for
ROA. Nevertheless, the government immediately released an estimated and
exaggerated figure of 1.67 million people in China who were eligible for entry,
and threatened that if the CFA ruling were to be implemented, it would have
great negative impact on Hong Kong's overall economy, employment, and various
social services and facilities, like housing, education, medical, and health and
welfare services. As a result, public support and sympathy for the claimants on
their right of abode collapsed almost overnight.
Nonetheless, OWP is not the only way that Chinese can gain residence status in
Hong Kong. For a privileged group of skilled workers, professionals and overseas
Chinese originally from China, they can migrate to Hong Kong by employment
through various channels. One such method is to stay in Hong Kong continuously
for seven years. Once they have done so, they are eligible to apply for
permanent resident status. Various schemes have promoted this.
First, because of the "brain drain" in the late 1980s, (3) in September 1990,
the colonial government and the Chinese authorities reached an agreement that
Chinese citizens who had resided overseas for two years or more could enter Hong
Kong with employment visas. Presumably, those persons are high level talents
with overseas exposure and are desirable to Hong Kong during the "brain drain"
crisis. Second, Chinese enterprises established in Hong Kong are allowed to
recruit employees from China without any quota limitation (Lam and Liu 1998:
34-5). Third, in March 1994, a Pilot Scheme for the entry of 1,000 Chinese
professionals was introduced. Entry was restricted to graduates of China's 36
key tertiary institutions who also had relevant working experience (Education
and Manpower Bureau, 1998). Later, an Admission of Talents Scheme was carried
out after the new Hong Kong SAR government decided to promote Hong Kong's
technological development. The scheme is quota-free and non-sector specific, and
the successful candidates can also bring along their families to Hong Kong. (4)
The Social Exclusion of the New Chinese Immigrants
Even though the ROA issue clearly indicates that the right of many new
immigrants to family reunion, which is granted by Basic Law, has been denied, it
constitutes only a small part of the social exclusion experienced by new
immigrants. By the time of the Chinese annexation of Hong Kong in 1997, Hong
Kong people had been deeply divided, despite the fact that these social
divisions were temporarily submerged by the economic boom in the 1980s. And,
with the impact of the Asian Economic Crisis, and the end of Hong Kong's
economic bubble, divisions were exacerbated.
As Hong Kong's economy has become "post-industrial,"just like other global
cities, income distribution has become increasingly unequal, (5) In 1986, the
lowest decile group earned only 1.6% of total household income. The figure
decreased to 1.1% in 1996. The highest group, however, earned 35.5% of total
household income in 1986, a figure which increased to 41.8% in 1996. During the
same period, the Gini Coefficient increased from 0.453 to 0.518, indicating the
widening income gap between rich and poor (Telephone interview, Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Department, 5 May 2000). The income gap continued to widen during
late 1990s. In 1999, the 200,000 families in the lowest income bracket earned an
average income of HK$3,000 per month, while the average family income was
HK$70,000 per month for the top 200,000 families with the highest income. The
high income bracket average is 23 times that for the low income bracket, as
compared to having been only 13 times as much in 1996 (Hong Kong Social Security
Society, 2000). The 2001 Population Census shows a wider gulf between rich and
poor. The percentage of poor families--those earning less than HK$6,000 a
month--rose from 10.8% in 1996 to 12.5% in 2001, while only 24.9% of households
made more than HK$30,000 a month in 1996, rising to 29% in 2001. Meanwhile,
families in the middle range of incomes fell from 64.4% in 1996 to 58.6% in 2001
(South China Morning Post, 21 October 200l. p. 1).
New immigrant families constitute a major proportion of Hong Kong's impoverished
underclass. Newly arrived families earn much less than the average income of
Hong Kong families. As indicated in Table 2, the median monthly family income
for new arrivals is about 34%-46% of the overall Hong Kong median household
income for years from 1998 to 2003. Over half of the new immigrant families have
an income that is less than half of the overall Hong Kong median family income.
Other than lower family income, the educational level of the new arrivals is
also, on average, lower than that of the Hong Kong population. Table 3 shows
that about 90% of Chinese children aged 15 and over only attain secondary school
educational level or below. Almost 30% of them have only primary school
education or below. Comparing those entitled to ROA and those not entitled to
ROA (after the re-interpretation of the Basic Law by China's National People's
Congress in 1999), it is found that the latter have lower educational levels
than the former. That means the latter group is even more vulnerable to economic
disadvantages. This was one of the main reasons why the SAR government resisted
granting ROA, claiming that ROA for poorly educated Chinese would increase Hong
Kong's unemployment rate by 2%, and would threaten Hong Kong's high-tech and
high value-added industrial development strategy (see Baark and So, 2006). Henry
Tang, then Executive Councillor and chairman of the Hong Kong General Chamber of
Industry, estimated that unemployment would double if the government failed to
stop the "flood" of poorly educated Chinese children born to Hong Kong people
(Hong Kong Commercial Press, 30 April 1999, p.B01). (6)
The trend for new immigrants to be mainly of people with lower educational
attainment still continued. In 1996, only 10.7% of new immigrants have tertiary
education, while the figure for their local counterparts was 15.2%, about 40%
higher than the new immigrants.' Five years later the proportion of new
immigrants with tertiary education dropped to 5.7%, while the figure for locals
was three times higher than that (Table 4).
The new arrivals' disadvantages in the labour market are shown by the sectors in
which they work and by their skill levels. From the 1996 data, presented in
Tables 5 and 6, new arrivals are mainly concentrated in either the sunset
industries (such as manufacturing) or the low-paid and low-skilled service
sector (wholesale, retail, import/ export trades, restaurants and hotels). Their
most frequent occupations are low-skilled ones; nearly half of the new arrivals
are elementary workers, service workers, and shop sale workers. However, less
than one quarter of the overall Hong Kong population works in these occupations.
Moreover, almost 30% of the whole population are managers, administrators,
professionals, and associate professionals, but only 15% of the new arrivals are
in this category.
Table 7 shows an obvious income inequality between the new arrivals and the
whole working population according to their highest educational attainment; as
the educational attainment gets higher, inequality becomes more serious. Indeed,
as Siu (1999: 220) observes, the disadvantaged labour market position of new
arrivals is due to local people's discrimination against their educational
attainments. According to a survey conducted by Human Resources Management
Association in 1997, 65% employers admit that new arrivals were employed mainly
due to their lower pay in comparison with locals (Ming Pao, 29 September 1998,
p. A04). This result is confirmed in another study (Society of Community
Organization [SoCO], 2001 : 24); 40% of the new arrival respondents report lower
wage and poorer welfare than their local counterparts. Even worse, 26% of the
respondents have experienced rejection from employment simply due to their
status as new immigrant.
The 2001 Population Census further demonstrates that the labour market situation
of new arrivals are worsening. One reason for this is the decline of Hong Kong's
manufacturing sector. The percentage of the labour force in manufacturing shrank
from 47% in 1971 to 14% in 1996, and has continued to decline. Few capitalist
economies have experienced such a rapid decline in the size of their industrial
labour force (Lang et al. 2001: 110). However, this decline has been even
quicker and has had an even more drastic impact on new immigrants. In 1996,
manufacturing was still the second largest employment sector for new immigrants
(25.3%). By 2001, the percentage shrank to 10.4%. Even if new arrivals can
retain their jobs, these jobs are now concentrated in the low-skill, low-paid,
and unstable service sector (e.g. retail, catering, and shop sales). There has
been an increase in the proportion of the new arrivals working in those sectors,
rising from 42.9% to 51.9% between 1996 and 2001. These rates have been greater
than for the Hong Kong population as a whole. The declining situation for new
immigrants can also be seen in the decline in the percentage of the new arrivals
working as managers and professionals. The figure declined from 10.3% in 1996 to
merely 3.9% in 2001; there has been no significant change for the overall Hong
Kong population over the same period. On the other hand, the percentage of the
new arrivals working in elementary occupations and working as service workers
and shop sales workers rose rapidly from 47.3% in 1996 to 65.6% in 2001. It may
be inferred that Hong Kong's economic restructuring towards a post-industrial
economy and a global city has meant both structural downgrading and
marginalization for new arrivals.
The issues of social exclusion and mobility do not just impact on recent
migrants. As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, Hong Kong residents who marry
Chinese face these issues, having rather low socio-economic status when compared
with the whole population. As most new arrivals migrated to Hong Kong for family
reunion, as the spouses or children of Hong Kong residents, it is not too
surprising to find such similarities. As Siu (1999: 226-7) argues, as most of
the new immigrants who came in the late 1970s were from the rural areas, and
lacked adequate education and skills, they could only take up low skill
occupations. Only a few of them can climb up 'he social ladder and escape the
lower strata of society. As a result, many of the new male immigrants cannot get
married in Hong Kong, and take wives from China, reinforcing a cycle of economic
disadvantage. Indeed, the current social exclusion of Chinese immigrants has its
roots in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The new immigrants are not only disadvantaged in terms of income, education, and
labour market opportunities, they are also disadvantaged in terms of housing.
The quarterly surveys on new arrivals conducted by the Home Affairs Department
show that their living environment is often very poor. Between 37% and 41% were
living in sub-let rooms, bed-spaces, cocklofts, or temporary housing, or as
squatters (Table 8). (7)
Most of the new arrivals reportedly face adaptation and integration problems.
According to surveys conducted by the Home Affairs Department through the years
1998 to 2003, about 70% to 78% of new arrivals report difficulties in adapting
to Hong Kong's way of life (see Table 9). (8) In the late 1990s, the most
frequently faced problem was the living environment, affecting over 50% of the
new immigrants. (9) From 2001, the most encountered problem was finding a job.
The third most encountered problem is family finance; more than one-third report
this problem. The survey results again show that new Chinese immigrants are
disadvantaged in their housing, labour market conditions and subsistence living
(see Table 10).
Finally, examining Table 11, while more than 50% of the new immigrant families
have a household income that is less than half of the overall Hong Kong
population median income, for the years 1998 to 2003, only about 11% to 13%
applied for Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA), the only public
assistance available in Hong Kong. In 1998, CSSA cases constitute about 10.7% of
the Hong Kong population, (10) meaning that there is no difference between new
arrivals and Hong Kong natives in applying for public assistance.
Can it be the case that new arrivals are really just as likely as locals to
receive the CSSA? In reality, the figure for those receiving the benefit is
surprisingly low when quite a number of new immigrant families are highly
impoverished. Indeed, a majority of new immigrant families live mainly on their
wages. Only a few of them have financial assistance from relatives. This can be
interpreted that most new arrivals are self-reliant, despite poverty. However,
it can also be interpreted that their resources, in terms of both public and
private supports, are very few. Thus after looking at the new immigrants'
income, labour market situation, education, and public and private support, we
see that they are multi-dimensionally disadvantaged, often for a long duration.
This disadvantage involves dissociation from the major social and occupational
milieus of society. The following sections will try to delineate the mechanisms
that create social exclusion of the new arrivals from a historical perspective.
Immigration Policies and Economic Development
According to Brochmann (1999a: 12), there are two kinds of immigration control:
external and internal. External control refers to the measures of visa
restrictions, legislation against illegal trafficking and clandestine
immigration, information campaigns designed in major emigration regions to
inform potential migrants of the minimal chances of entering countries, and
negotiating with the authorities of emigration countries for controlling the
exit of potential immigrants. Internal control includes the requirement of
residence and work permits, the use of ID cards, employer sanctions, and
inspection of work sites or of public places. Immigration control is a mixture
of external and internal controls. The following will discuss how Hong Kong's
immigration control has been related to its economic development.
Immigration and economic development are inseparable in Hong Kong. Historically,
border controls between Hong Kong and China were loose, often absent. In earlier
times, the migration pattern can be described as circular. A lot of young men
from the rural areas of southern China came to Hong Kong looking for work. When
demand contracted, or when they earned enough money, these men would go back to
their Chinese homes. However, when they experienced economic hardship or
political turbulences in China, they would again migrate to Hong Kong. In other
words, Hong Kong always maintained a flexible pool of migrants who provided
sufficient and politically timid labour essential for establishing Hong Kong as
the major trading port in the "Far East."
Since Hong Kong's economic development up until the 1960s was contingent upon
low labour cost, a constant flow of Chinese from China was required, and it can
be argued that a more permanent Chinese population might have posed social
problems for the colonial state, including the potential for increased service
provisions. The colonial authorities might also have encountered political
challenges as the Chinese immigrants became more concerned about local affairs.
Adopting a hands-off immigration policy ensured that most migrants' main social
and political concerns lay in China.
The situation changed dramatically after the Communist takeover of China. Most
immigrants preferred not to return to China and settled in Hong Kong. According
to Hambro (1955: 185, 188), over half of the post-war migrants preferred to
remain in Hong Kong, while two-fifths preferred emigration (although just 16%
had attempted to emigrate. In other words, the transient nature of the Hong Kong
migrant population ceased. As suggested above, this created some concerns for
the colonial administration. It was estimated that at least half of the migrants
had incomes below the minimum subsistence level. Only a quarter of them lived in
a flat or a house, most lived in huts or cubicles (Hambro, 1955: 173-6).
Nonetheless, even under these poor circumstances, the immigrants rarely
challenged colonial authority. Instead, they dealt with poverty, crowded and
unhealthy living conditions, long working hours and low-paying jobs and raised
few political demands. It is usually said that this lack of political activism
was due to the migrants being pragmatic, for among the post-war immigrants,
53.2% left China for political reasons, 37.2% for economic reason and 8.5% for
both (Hambro, 1955: 152). Since most migrated to escape China's Communist
regime, and did not have anywhere else to go, they had to accept colonial
authority and endure economic hardship. So, again, the colonial state gained a
cheap workforce at minimal political cost.
These immigrants provided the reservoir of cheap unskilled labour necessary for
the manufacturing takeoff that took place from the 1960s onwards. At this time,
relatively low wages in Hong Kong spurred labour-intensive industrialisation.
The fact that low wages could be maintained during the industrialisation period,
to a large extent, can be attributed to the several major waves of Chinese
immigration both legal and illegal, which boosted the population and hence the
labour supply. This explains why, before 1974, nearly all immigrants were
allowed to stay in Hong Kong, even though a number of internal control measures
were implemented, including the use of ID cards and the amendment of immigration
ordinance (Zheng and Wong, 2003).
During the 1970s, the colonial state attempted to launch welfare projects in
order to legitimise its authority, which had been challenged in the 1966 and
1967 riots (discussed below). Dramatic population increases meant more resources
had to be put into these welfare projects. Nevertheless, population increases
also meant labour force expansion, which could maintain the low-wage level
necessary for the manufacturing sector's international competitiveness. It was
against this economic and socio-political background that the "Touch-Base
Policy" was designed. The Touch-Base Policy had two distinct advantages.
Firstly,
its discretionary basis allowed the authorities to exercise flexible
immigration control, in terms of both numbers and quality of new
entrants. As long as new immigrants were needed, less forceful
implementation would allow candidates for regularisation of stay
simply to move into Hong Kong. Should the figures go out of control,
stricter border controls would enable the authorities to put a
firmer check on illegal border crossings and increase the number of
persons subject to repatriation. (Destexhe 1995: 28)
Secondly, the Policy was used to demonstrate the state's willingness and ability
to control the inflow of illegal immigrants, thus silencing the critics who
charged that immigrants were causing social problems, like crime and
prostitution, and creating shortages in the provision of social services.
However, this internal control mechanism could only work when the inflow of
illegal immigrants was stable. It proved to be ineffective when large numbers of
immigrants sneaked into Hong Kong at the same time. This happened right after
China's open-door policy was launched. The abolition of the Touch-Base Policy
coincided with the economic difficulties faced by the Hong Kong economy in the
late 1970s, when the textile and clothing industries, the major exporting
industries at that time, were encountering increasing Western protectionism as
well as keen competition from other industrialising countries. The voices urging
the colonial state to initiate a structural transformation of the economy were
widespread in the industrial communities. Consequently, in 1977, the government
appointed a high-level commission, the Advisory Committee on Diversification to
study the possibility of future industrial development. To facilitate the
economic transformation, professionals, technicians and skilled workers were
needed, instead of the unskilled cheap Chinese immigrants. Consequently, the
Touch-Base Policy was abolished.
While strengthening its internal control, the colonial state also recognised
that these mechanisms were doomed to fail without corresponding cooperation from
China. As a result, the colonial state began to negotiate with the Chinese
authorities on the introduction of controls within China. In order to increase
flexibility in controlling the inflow of Chinese immigration, the OWP quota
system was further institutionalised in 1980 by fixing the number of permits
issued each year.
Although illegal immigration should have been reduced after the abolition of the
Touch-Base Policy, the hiring of illegal migrant workers was still pervasive on
construction sites, fish farms or fishing vessels, and in businesses like
restaurants, factories, and goldsmith workshops. Since there is no control on
the wage levels of illegal migrant workers, the scope for exploitation is high.
It becomes very profitable for the small businesses to risk employing illegal
immigrants. Within the construction industry, the demand for labour was
continuously rising because of the rapidly developing property market from 1984
onwards. While there have been booms and busts during the period, labour
shortages occurred frequently. The government had difficulties in monitoring the
employment of migrant workers in construction. The only way to monitor migrant
workers is to inspect individual construction sites regularly, but resources did
not permit this. In addition, because of the pervasive subcontracting system in
the construction industry, it is lower-tiered subcontractors rather than the
principal contractors who are responsible for construction operations. This
complicates the processes of inspecting malpractices. However, in 1990, stricter
legislation was introduced. The aim was to make the principal contractor
responsible for the presence of illegal immigrants on his/her site and liable to
substantial fines. To further guard against employment of illegal workers, the
state legislated to require employers to inspect the job seeker's ID card or
travel document in 1996. (11) Even with these tighter controls, the state
continued to tolerate the employment of illegal migrant workers simply because
of the labour shortages encountered in various business sectors.
At the same time, there were important structural changes taking place within
the Hong Kong economy as it deindustrialised. The moves of the state to further
formalise and tighten the regulations regarding the internal control of the
low-skilled migrant workers can be attributed to the decline of manufacturing as
firms relocated to low-waged zones in southern China from the mid-1980s.
Unskilled migrant workers, who have contributed much to Hong Kong's
industrialisation, were no longer in great demand. This relocation meant
unemployment for manufacturing workers, and some social discontent, which led to
demands for restrictions on the inflow of unskilled and low-skilled workers.
Deindustrialisation signifies Hong Kong's transformation to a post-industrial
economy, where producer services become the major engine of growth. However,
numerous studies show that a global city still requires low-paid and low-level
service jobs, such as catering, retailing, construction and cleaning services,
created as a result of the expanding high-level services (Mollenkopf and
Castells, 1991 ; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe, 1992; Sassen, 1991, 1998). Hong
Kong is no exception (see Skeldon, 1996). Nonetheless, the wages of these
low-level service jobs were pushed up by inflation from the mid-1980s to the
late 1990s. Consequently, the colonial state faced pressure from business to
again relax its immigration policies.
Being torn between labour and business interest groups, the government launched
the labour importation scheme in 1989, while at the same time strengthening the
implementation of controls to check illegal immigration. As shown in 1994
figures released by the government, a majority of the applications by employers
to import migrant workers under the scheme were concentrated in catering, retail
and construction, and the applications greatly outnumbered the actual quota
allocated (Skeldon, 1996:191). These figures indicate that demand continued for
the cheap migrant service workers.
Although many low-level service jobs were opened for Chinese migrants, the
government refused to allow Chinese maids to be included in the Labour
Importation Scheme (SCMP, 19 November 1994). This was because the government
feared that Chinese domestic helpers would be difficult to police, and that many
would change jobs and disappear easily into the local community (Skeldon,
1996:189).
There were few limits or restrictions on the numbers of foreign professionals,
managerial or high-level technical personnel staying in Hong Kong so long as
they remain employed (Skeldon, 1996: 186). In addition, the rise in educational
qualifications of the local population provided an adequate professional
workforce for Hong Kong's further development. Thus, Hong Kong's professional
labour market was seldom a problem before mid 1980s. The immigration of skilled
personnel only became an issue when the "brain drain" caused by the 1989
Tiananmen Massacre created a serious shortage of highly skilled people. This
caused the colonial state to relax rules on immigration of Chinese
professionals. After the Chinese annexation of Hong Kong, the new SAR government
attempted to initiate a number of measures to push Hong Kong toward becoming a
competitive global metropolis through developing and applying state-of-the-art
technology (see Baark and So, 2006). Under this new economic policy, "Chinese
sourcing," attracting overseas and domestic Chinese "knowledge workers," became
a major strategy to enlarge the pool of technical human resources necessary for
creating new competitive edge. Corresponding to the Chinese sourcing strategy,
the Admission of Talents Scheme was announced in 1999. (12)
In short, Hong Kong's immigration control regime has changed in accordance with
the development of the economy. Under the pressure of keen competition among
global cities triggered by globalisation, the government actively seeks Chinese
talent that might help transform the economy into a knowledge-based metropolis.
At the same time that the government is relaxing immigration controls for this
group, it is tightening them for unskilled Chinese workers.
State Building, Citizenship and Identity
Society can be considered a status hierarchy bound together by sets of mutual
rights and obligations that are rooted in a broader moral order. Each citizen
has the right to a basic standard of living and to participate in the major
social and occupational institutions of the society. Social exclusion is a
process of becoming detached from this moral order. This means that the social
rights of the socially excluded are denied. As a result, they will tend to
suffer processes of generalised and persisting disadvantage and their social and
occupational participation will be undermined (Room 1995: 6).
What causes social exclusion? Berghman (1995: 19) argues that social exclusion
occurs when one or more of the following systems fail to function: (a) the
democratic and legal system, which promotes civic integration; (b) the labour
market, which promotes economic integration; (c) the welfare state system,
promoting what may be called social integration; and/or (d) the family and
community system, which promotes interpersonal integration.
All these four systems fail to promote civic or social integration in Hong Kong,
and indeed, many of the state policies within these systems are/were
(unintentionally) designed for system integration at the expense of social
integration. The Hong Kong political and legal system exhibit aspects of British
heritage and tradition, but in practice, the colonial state had enormous
autonomy in designing its political system and policies. The result was that
Hong Kong remained an authoritarian state, only recently and partially
democratising.
How does the political and legal system of Hong Kong affect the social exclusion
of new Chinese immigrants? Drawing from the experience of European countries,
Brochmann (1999a: 16) argues that the state's "control culture" has a great
influence on the policy outcomes of immigration controls. Control culture refers
to "traditions in terms of humanitarian values, cultural openness towards the
outside world, and legitimacy as to using economic conditions as a premise for
policy-making in relation to immigration control."
The Hong Kong state has a long tradition of using economic conditions as the
most important premise for policy-making, not merely in relation to immigration
control, but to nearly all aspects of public policy-making. Economic prosperity
is regarded as the cornerstone of the state's legitimacy. Humanitarian values
have seldom occupied a significant place in policy-making. Under this control
culture, Hong Kong's population tends to resist anything that is construed as
endangering economic prosperity. Once Chinese immigrants are perceived as an
economic burden, discrimination and resentment becomes obvious. Within this
system, the social inclusion of immigrants is highly contingent upon economic
conditions, especially labour market conditions, and public perceptions of their
economic contribution.
It is also clear that historic labour market conditions have been a major
determinant of social inclusion. As outlined above, cheap unskilled labour was
essential for Hong Kong's early economic development, up to the late 1970s.
Thus, the colonial state was very "open" to Chinese immigrants, and the migrants
could easily find jobs without being seen to be threatening local jobs. In these
periods, the labour market could actually promote the economic integration of
the Chinese immigrants.
However, the scene changed rapidly at the time when Hong Kong was further
strengthening its regional role and gradually developed more economic
integration with China, especially after China's open door policy was
inaugurated. The structural transformation of the labour market that followed
began to differentiate immigrants into two categories, the unskilled and the
professional. Correspondingly, state immigration policy has changed. Unskilled
immigrants who are legally granted ROA and come for family reunion are subject
to strict immigration control, while Chinese professionals are invited to come.
This odd policy outcome is a product of the interplay of Hong Kong's state
control culture and the labour market transformation under global restructuring.
Besides the state's control culture and labour market condition, Hong Kong's
welfare system is also conducive to discrimination to new immigrants. Hong Kong
has never been a welfare state. However, welfare provision and administration
became an important means by which the colonial state secured its legitimacy
(Law and Wong, 1997), although social welfare was never a major financial
investment before the 1970s. Even though there were a huge number of Chinese
migrants who fled to Hong Kong after the Second World War, as aptly described by
Welsh (1994: 454), "the colonial authorities' attitude toward refugees was
likened to that of a railway station's employees towards the passengers; their
responsibility was to look after the permanent staff, and not 'to shower
benefits on passengers merely passing through'." The state-society relation was
basically a minimally-integrated one (Lau, 1982).
As rapid industrialisation proceeded, the Hong Kong economy grew affluent, but
the working conditions and standard of living of workers did not greatly
improve. As a result, signs of discontent surfaced, and in 1956, 1966 and 1967
there were riots. The 1966 riots originated from a protest against ferry fare
increase. The rioters were mainly poorly paid young workers. The 1967 riots were
precipitated by labour disputes and influenced by China's Cultural Revolution.
The riots led by the pro-Communist Federation of Trade Unions were a frontal
attack on the colonial government and its capitalist system. The riots were
later interpreted by the colonial state as originating from the failure of
bridging the gap between the state and the Chinese population and addressing
grassroots grievances (Leung, 1996: 22). This precipitated a series of
statebuilding projects aimed at constructing a society that would enhance the
colonial state's legitimacy. Sir Murray MacLehose, Hong Kong Governor in the
1970s and early 1980s, was the designer of these projects, and social welfare
reform was one of these projects.
The idea of citizenship, rooted in the British colonial administration, was not
nurtured in Hong Kong until the 1970s. Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong seldom
identified themselves as "Hong Kong yan" (Hong Kong people, or Hong Kongers),
but rather by their places of origin. However, under MacLehose, governance aimed
to produce a civil society and an ideal citizen (in its own terms). This was the
first time that the colonial state attempted to imagine a local society and a
responsible citizenship (Jacquet, 1997). From the 1970s, the government and the
mass media contributed much to the promotion of the ideas like "citizens",
"community" and "Hong Kong yan". A unifying concept like Hong Kong yan was an
attempt to respond to the riots and to strengthen the government's legitimacy.
The projects concerning social welfare were of paramount importance in shaping
Hong Kong identity. While people in the 1970s were not much concerned with
politics, in part this was because the colonial state depoliticised
policy-making (King, 1981). The state's welfare project was built upon "four
pillars": housing, education, medical and health care, and social welfare (in
the narrow sense of public assistance, caring for the elderly and disabled, and
the provision of recreational facilities). This project touched many aspects of
everyday life. As Brochmann (1999a: 15) noted, social redistribution requires
more restrictive territorial closure. Thus the concept of Hong Kong yan (which
is basically a spatially fixed construct) was created and reproduced repeatedly
when Hong Kong people used their identification cards (IDs) to access social or
welfare services. Some internal controls create administrative barriers that
limit poor immigrants' access to housing and social benefits so as to discourage
further legal and illegal immigration. For instance, only those who have resided
in Hong Kong for more than a year can apply for public assistance; concerning
housing, only those households in which more than half of the household members
aged 18 or above have resided in Hong Kong for more than seven years can apply
for public housing. It is not difficult to understand why 58% of the new
arrivals who are CSSA applicants think that they are racially discriminated
against by Hong Kong yah (SoCO, 2001: 50).
When considering social exclusion, the question of spatiality or territory
cannot be avoided because detachment from labour market and community are
territory-based. From Table 12, we can see that for many years, most of the new
arrivals' residences have been territorially assembled in the poorest districts
(either in terms of the "poverty rate" or the median monthly household income);
that is, in Sham Shui Po, Kwun Tong, Yuen Long, and Tuen Mun. The latter two
districts are remote from the job locations where newly arrived migrants are
usually employed. They are also areas where the social service provisions for
the unemployed, poor, family (especially for single-parent family), child-care
and women are inadequate. Lack of community support and care in these districts
crafts a more difficult territory for them to be socially included (Leung,
2004a). Sham Shui Po and Kwun Tong, while close to the central business
district, are also notorious for their poverty, slums, environmental problems
and law and order problems. New arrivals in these districts are often
stigmatised by their territorial location. As a result, the stronger social
identity associated with territory makes the inclusion of immigrants even more
difficult.
Discrimination against immigrants does not always stem directly from deliberate
state policies, but is generated and regenerated through stereotyping and
labelling within everyday conversation and social interaction. In Hong Kong,
stereotypes of people are coded in terms of place of origin, like Guangdong yan,
Beijing yan and Shanghai yah and the like. Thus the emergence of the concept of
Hong Kong yah is a pre-condition for differentiating Hong Kongers and Chinese.
Nevertheless, the differentiation does not directly correspond to the social
division of Hong Kongers and Chinese immigrants, though locals will think that
Chinese immigrants are most different from Hong Kong yan in terms of living
habits and thought/conception, even more "different" than those from South Asia.
Locals also believe that Chinese immigrants are the weakest ethnic group in
political and economic arenas (Wong and Wan, 2001: 446-50).
Restrictive immigration controls contribute to the stigmatisation of immigrants
as "unwanted" (Brochmann 1999b: 318). In Hong Kong, immigration controls after
the 1980s, coinciding with economic restructuring, were the major causes of
unfavourable stereotypes and the stigmatisation of Chinese immigrants. This has
especially been the case for illegal immigrants. When some are apprehended, the
Immigration Department assiduously constructed a causal relationship between the
existence of illegal workers and then prevailing high unemployment rates. In
fact, however, when the unemployed numbered more than 240,000 in 2004, only
5,000 suspected illegal workers were arrested during 7,659 "anti-illegal
workers" inspection actions (Hong Kong Economic Journal, 29 January 2005, p. 4).
Obviously, the handful of illegal workers who were apprehended were scapegoats
for the broader unemployment problem.
The media often exaggerates and sensationalises reports on these cases. As the
government's Home Affairs Branch (1997: para 6.4) observed, "It is rather common
for the media to portray new arrivals as poor, lazy, uneducated, and generally
less capable than local people." The stereotyping of new immigrants began in the
late 1970s when economic restructuring began. As economic integration between
Hong Kong and Southern China began, cross-border communications increased
tremendously. As various problems in China were exposed, the tone of the popular
Hong Kong media became negative towards China as well as towards Chinese (Cheng,
1990). In a popular TV soap opera broadcast in 1979, a pejorative term "Ah Chan"
was first introduced to describe a lazy, uneducated, and incapable new immigrant
character. Later, another popular movie described a gang of migrant criminals,
nicknamed "Tai Huen" ("Big Circle", an old nickname of Guangzhou City), as
greedy, merciless, and extremely hateful toward Hong Kong yan. Such pejorative
terms have entered daily vocabulary, and stereotype all Chinese immigrants.
Consequently, Chinese, new Chinese immigrants included, are often singled out as
a distinct social category with a negative image. The differentiation between
Hong Kong yan and Chinese yan, in a negative sense, was completed.
This social differentiation became a social division when manufacturing firms
continued to relocate to southern China. As demand for unskilled labour shrank,
the state was most reluctant to provide more social welfare to combat growing
income disparities. The result was that the living conditions of the lower
strata of the local Hong Kong population began to deteriorate. At the same time,
capitalists continued to pressure the state to permit them to exploit cheap
imported Chinese labour, all the while complaining of the low level of skills of
the new immigrants. Top business leaders like Peter Wong, the executive director
of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, said that the daily quota of 150
Chinese arrivals imposed a "huge burden" on Hong Kong, that their contribution
to economic development was limited, and yet they have access to welfare. Mike
Rowse, director of Invest Hong Kong, even described the SAR's immigration policy
as "madness" as the government had no control over the selection of immigrants:
Hong Kong needs to maintain the upper hand, to make continuous
progress at faster pace such as developing high-tech and high-valued
industries. However, most of the new immigrants are poorly educated
and they do not match our needs and development direction" (cited in
South China Morning Post, 29 April 2002).
A survey conducted by The Hong Kong Psychological Society in 1997 reveals that
Hong Kong people consider new migrants from China ignorant, rude, dirty, and
greedy, and believe they are introducing evils from China. The newcomers were
also seen as aggravating the territory's social problems by increasing
competition for jobs, houses, and welfare benefits. Hong Kong people showed
little sympathy for Chinese immigrants' plight, felt new immigrants deserved the
hardships they experienced and would not make much progress even if given more
government assistance (cited in South China Morning Post, 10 March 1997). As
Hong Kong's economic recession deepened, Hong Kong people's negative perception
towards new arrivals further deteriorated; a 2002 survey showed that, since
2000, the percentage of respondents agreeing that new arrivals were selfish,
emotional, greedy, cowardly, annoying, arrogant, isolated, and uncivilized had
increased. Such changes were consistent from school students to adult
respondents (Hong Kong Council of Social Service, 2003). According to SoCO's
survey (2001: 10-11), 82% of new, adult, Chinese immigrant respondents believe
that they are racially discriminated against by Hong Kong people, especially by
the general public (88.9%), being denounced as "parasites" (78.5%). One of the
results of this attitude and strict immigration control is that many of the
immigrants of the 1970s and 1980s have been separated from families. Family
reunion is often postponed for years and these families face tremendous hardship
(Leung and Wong, 2003: 55). Even when there is family reunion, these families
have to face discrimination (SoCO, 2001: 7-8).
Social exclusion did not begin with the return of Hong Kong to China.
Paradoxically, however, it has accelerated under the SAR government which is
both a Chinese and local government. Against the widespread mistrust of first
Chief Executive Tung Chee Wah's administration, established after the Chinese
annexation of Hong Kong, and the economic downturn following the Asian Financial
Crisis, the Hong Kong state attempted to re-establish its legitimacy. The ROA
issue presented such an opportunity. By exaggerating the number of potential
immigrants and constructing them as an "unbearable burden" for Hong Kong's
welfare system the Tung administration successfully gained support (Ta Kung Pao,
15 February 1999). The argument was that immigrants posed threats to employment,
housing ("squatters may appear again all over the urban districts"), education
and public health (the Secretary of Security Branch reported in Hong Kong
Economic Times, 29 April 1999). Ultimately, Tung was unsuccessful in bolstering
his government's popularity, but did exacerbate existing social division between
Hong Kong yan and new immigrants. (13)
Conclusion
This article has shown how recent Chinese immigrants are socially excluded in
Hong Kong. It has been argued that the mechanisms of social exclusion are the
result of the interplay of several factors: immigration policies, the stage of
the economic development, state-building and local identity formation. From a
historical perspective, it is shown that Hong Kong's immigration policy regime
corresponds with the developmental stage of the economy. When Hong Kong was
industrialising, the colonial state had to initiate a number of state projects
in order to establish its legitimation. Against these state projects, Hong Kong
identity, in terms of Hong Kong yan, emerged. Later, Hong Kong's economic
restructuring, part of processes associated with globalisation and China's open
door policy established the differentiation between Hong Kong yan and Chinese
yan. As economic restructuring deepened without a corresponding adjustment to
state policies, social differentiation became social division. After the Chinese
annexation of Hong Kong, the Tung administration further intensified existing
social divisions, and created a situation where the social exclusion of recent
new arrivals and their families resulted. To the extent that an economic-centric
identity remains pervasive in Hong Kong, a more socially minded concept of
citizenship is needed. The basic task of reasserting that people living or
aspiring to live in Hong Kong have a value beyond their value in markets, is
still very difficult (Leung, 2004b: 110).
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Notes
(1.) The authors thank Kevin Hewison and Graeme Lang, not only for their
extremely useful comments after reading the drafts of the article thoroughly,
but their encouragement during the writing process. The authors also acknowledge
the research assistance from Kit Lain and Leona Ng. The usual disclaimer
applies.
(2.) Chinese migrants have had different names at different periods. Before the
1970s, they were called "refugees." But in the 1970s and 1980s, they were called
"new immigrants" to delineate their nonrefugee status. However, from the 1990s,
they were called "'new arrivals" because, after the Chinese annexation of Hong
Kong, it seemed inappropriate to call migrants from China immigrants (Siu,
1999).
(3.) Beginning in the mid-1970s, according to official figures, emigration from
Hong Kong remained at about 20,000 per annum for the following ten years, then
accelerated to reach 30,000 in 1987, and 66,000 (and perhaps more) in 1992. A
large number of these emigrants were in the highly educated and highly skilled
categories. This acceleration of emigration caught official and public attention
and generated the "doomsday interpretation"--the best and brightest were fleeing
Hong Kong before the transfer of the British colony to Chinese sovereignty on 1
July 1997, causing the loss of skilled manpower and leading to a decline in
productivity and the demise of Hong Kong as a viable industrial and financial
center (Skeldon, 1995: 56-7).
(4.) Immigration Department, HKSAR, http://www.infogov.hk/immd/admission/eng_index.htm
(accessed 30 May 2000).
(5.) For example, in the US, the wealthiest 20% of households in 1973 accounted
for 44% of total income. Their share jumped to 50% in 2002, while everyone
else's fell. For the bottom fifth of households, their share dropped from 4.2%
to 3.5%. The average income of the top 20% grew to 76% over the 35-year span
from 1967 to 2002. For the bottom fifth, meanwhile, grew by 34% (see The
Washington Post, 17 August 2004).
(6.) In 2005, Henry Tang was the Financial Secretary.
(7.) Since late 1998, the categories of housing used in the survey have changed,
lumping sub-let rooms, bed-spaces, cocklofts and squatters into "private
permanent housing." As a result, the subsequent reports fail to indicate the
severity of new arrivals' living conditions.
(8.) The definition of new arrivals adopted by the Home Affairs Department (HAD)
is quite different from that adopted by the Census and Statistics Department (CSD).
In the surveys conducted by HAD, "new arrivals" refers only to those aged 11 or
above and arriving in Hong Kong from China in the past year, while "new
arrivals" in CSD usage, refers to persons from China having resided in Hong Kong
for less than seven years.
(9.) According to SoCO's study (2001: 7, 9), 90% of respondents have applied for
housing welfare, but 54.4% of them find that they are hindered simply because of
their new arrival status. On the other hand, 35% of respondents have experience
of being refused rental of private housing. The major reasons for the refusal
were because of newly arrived children or a fear that new immigrants were unable
to afford the rent.
(10.) There were 218,400 CSSA cases in September 1998, while there were slightly
more than two million households at the fourth quarter of 1998 The figure is
from Report on Review of the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme was
released by the Social Welfare Department in December 1998.
(11.) Actually, the amendment of the Immigration Ordinance in 1980 states
clearly that employers have to inspect the identity document of "new recruits."
The 1996 legislation further requires employers to inspect the identity document
of "job seekers."
(12.) The outcome of these measures has been unsatisfactory. Under the Pilot
Scheme (1994-97), stringent procedures meant that 80% of the applications were
withdrawn by the applicants themselves. Only 60% of the quota (602 cases) was
finally approved. Even worse, as a quota-free and non-sector specific scheme,
SAR government's Admission of Talents Scheme 1999 had only 111 successful
applicants, far below the government's estimation of 2,000 (Lee, 2004: 19-20).
(13.) According to SoCO's survey (2001: 9-10), over 90% of respondents believe
that the government's comments on new immigrants triggered greater
discrimination.