Hu Jintao

Hu Jintao replaced the comparatively liberal-minded and popular Wu Jinghua as TAR Party Secretary. Wu had carried out liberal policies initiated by Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, such as reducing the number of Chinese cadres in Tibet and promoting Tibetan leadership. When a replacement for Wu's predecessor was being considered, the former Panchen Lama, who was quite influential at the time, lobbied Beijing intensively for the post to be given to a Tibetan. Wu's appointment was seen as a compromise. He was Yi nationality, not Han Chinese, and was well liked by the Panchen Lama. Ultimately, the Party considered Wu to have been too permissive in Tibet, and he was blamed for creating the atmosphere that led to pro-independence demonstrations in late 1987 and early 1988.

The decision to appoint Hu Jintao as TAR Party Secretary may have been made, in part, to give him exposure to the military, which plays a more dominant role in the TAR than in any other province or autonomous region. Hu's appointment was considered by some to be a downgrade for an aspiring Party careerist, but it is clear that Beijing wanted someone solid who could be trusted to rigorously implement Party policies in the restive region.

Hu Jintao's Tibet appointment was announced on December 9, 1988. The following day, perhaps in response to the announcement, a large demonstration rocked Lhasa, Tibet's capital city. People's Armed Police opened fire on the demonstrators at close range, killing several Tibetans who carried Tibet's outlawed national flag and seriously wounding a Dutch photographer.

Hu Jintao arrived in Lhasa in mid-January 1989 and one of his first meetings was with a Tibetan Buddhist leader, suggesting that he may have wanted to be seen as respectful of Tibetan religious sentiments. On January 23, Hu traveled to Shigatse, the seat of the Panchen Lama, to participate in a meeting convened for his behalf. He sat next to the Panchen Lama and announced that he "considered himself a member of the Tibetan people" and "would share a common fate with the Tibetan people and work wholeheartedly for their benefit." Incredibly, the Panchen Lama used the occasion to deliver a scathing report on China's administration of Tibet, declaring that Chinese rule had resulted in more harm than benefit to Tibetans. It was a daring speech that startled the Chinese and came to be seen as a defining critique of modern Tibet.

A few days after the meeting, the Panchen Lama died at Tashi Lhunpo, his monastery in Shigatse. Many Tibetans believe Hu Jintao had some hand in the unexpected death of the Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama's death created a vacuum in Tibetan leadership in Tibet that has yet to be filled.

Later that year, on December 10, 1989, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, thrusting the exiled leader onto the world stage with new credibility and prestige. Thus, Hu Jintao was faced with a situation where he had no credible, senior Tibetan leader with whom he could work, while the Dalai Lama was gaining international prominence.

The profound sense of loss felt by the Tibetan people with the Panchen Lama's passing, coupled with the widespread belief that his death resulted from unnatural causes, contributed to further unrest. In early March 1989, massive demonstrations began to resemble a popular uprising as thousands of Tibetans took to the streets, barricaded Tibetan sections of Lhasa and looted Chinese shops. Estimates of between 40 and 130 Tibetans were killed by the People's Armed Police over a three day period as Chinese forces tried to regain control over the Tibetan quarter. Police indiscriminately fired into some areas, killing not only demonstrators but also Tibetans hiding in their homes. In an April 20, 1989, speech broadcast on Radio Lhasa, Hu referred to the demonstrations as a "major event" in the course of China's 40-year occupation of Tibet comparing its significance with the March 1959 Tibetan uprising, "democratic reform," and the 1962 Indo-China war.

At midnight on March 7, after phone consultations with Beijing, Hu Jintao announced the imposition of martial law in Lhasa, abruptly ending more than a decade of liberalization in Tibet. Hu oversaw the deployment of 2,000 People's Liberation Army troops who occupied Lhasa and arrested hundreds of Tibetans. During the ensuing year of martial law, Lhasa's numerous prison facilities overflowed, and detainees were subjected to sadistic and horrifying treatment, as reported to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.

In the summer of 1989 when martial law was imposed in Beijing as a result of events in Tiananmen Square, it had already been in effect in Lhasa for months. Hu Jintao reportedly sent a telegram from Tibet to leaders in Beijing expressing his support for their "crackdown policy."

There are those who feel that Hu Jintao did not have a choice in terms of his action in Tibet. Professor Joseph Fewsmith, a China specialist at Boston University, said: "No doubt Hu Jintao did his job efficiently, but there is little reason to hold him accountable for deciding these policies. He was a 45-year-old, newly appointed Party Secretary, the first civilian appointment to hold the leadership post in Tibet, and was surrounded by grizzled veterans of the PLA who, no doubt, had their own ideas on how to handle the Tibetans. It is no doubt true that if Hu had displayed 'weakness' in the face of civil disturbances, he would have been passed over for later promotion."

Whether or not circumstances forced Hu Jintao's hand in the TAR, as the highest-ranking official he approved and implemented hard-line policies and remains accountable for them. At least 25 Tibetan political prisoners who were sentenced during his tenure remain in Drapchi prison; among their cases are some of the most egregious examples of China's campaign against the Tibetan identity. Also during this time, the methodology of dealing with political prisoners changed to embrace tools of intimidation such as the isolation of troublesome individual prisoners from the general prison population and the use of mass prison beatings and sentence extensions.

It is widely believed that Hu Jintao never saw his stint in the TAR as his real work. Unlike his previous Party assignments in Gansu and Guizhou provinces, where he conducted extensive tours, Hu hardly ventured out to the Tibetan countryside. By the time Hu was named TAR Party Secretary, his eyes were set on Beijing and a bigger role.

China watcher Jonathan Mirsky recounts an incident with Hu Jintao that indicates Hu's distrust of Tibetans. Mirsky wrote in the Guardian: "I once had a chance encounter with Hu. Not knowing I was a journalist, he told me how much he disliked Tibet's altitude, climate and lack of culture. He was keeping his family in Beijing, he told me, and feared that if there were ever an uprising against the Chinese, no Tibetan would protect him."

The political highlight of Hu Jintao's stay in Tibet came in the summer of 1990 when Jiang Zemin paid a visit to demonstrate his confidence in Hu. Soon after, Hu was appointed First Secretary of the Tibet Military District CCP Committee. However, in October 1990, less than 2 years after his Tibet posting began, Hu left Lhasa and moved back to Beijing. At the time, it was often reported that Hu had developed health problems relating to Tibet's altitude, although whether he truly suffered from altitude sickness is questionable. An official biography says that he "braved the plateau region's hostile natural conditions including a shortage of atmospheric oxygen."

For the next two years, Hu continued to hold the position of TAR Party Secretary and the Tibet 'Autonomous' Region was, in fact, governed directly from Beijing. In October 1992, Hu Jintao was promoted to the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee, making him the 7th most powerful man in China. In January 1992, Chen Kuiyuan was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Party in Tibet, a move that readied him to take over from Hu Jintao later that year.

Perhaps a better indicator of Hu's ideological leanings and views on so-called "minority" policy than his own years in Lhasa may be the extent to which he backed Chen, who put into place further hard-line changes in policy toward religion, culture and the Dalai Lama.

Tibetans soon came to regard Chen Kuiyuan as the least tolerant Chinese leader of Tibet since the Cultural Revolution, and many high-ranking Tibetan cadres wrote to the central authorities in Beijing to complain about Chen's harsh policies. Those entreaties were largely dismissed, and many believe that Hu Jintao was the point person on Tibet in Beijing and that he was backing Chen's new harsh policies. (During the mid and late 1990s, the other national figure who would have been in the position to back Chen on Tibet policy was Li Ruihuan, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee.)

Chinese government policy for Tibet is determined during a periodic work forum; and there have been four since 1980. The Third Work Forum, held in Beijing in July 1994, produced far-reaching revisions, and Hu Jintao was present during the forum, though the nature of his role is unclear.

Despite Hu Jintao's record as TAR Party Secretary, there are Tibetans who hope that he can play a positive role in the future of Tibet. Some prominent Tibetan leaders currently serving in the TAR and other Tibetan areas maintain that since Hu has direct experience with the sentiments of Tibetans, he could be more responsive to Tibetan interests than past Chinese leaders. On November 9, 2001, Hu told journalists in Berlin, "I have been in Tibet for almost four years and I am very familiar with the situation."

Some China analysts believe that because Hu Jintao has had experience working in Gansu, Guizhou and the TAR, he may have the credibility to change minority policies more drastically than any previous Chinese leader. Hu Jintao periodically projects his connections with the Tibetan people. During the annual meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing where it is the tradition of the national leaders to meet the regional delegates, Hu has been the one to meet with Tibetans. On March 5, 2002, Hu told Tibetan delegates to the Ninth NPC that accelerating economic development, promoting reforms and improving the people's living standard were the central tasks for Tibet in the new historical era and the basis to solve all problems there.

Among the Tibetan leaders who have worked closely with Hu Jintao are Dorjee Tsering, the Minister for Civil Affairs in Beijing and former Chairman of the TAR government; Tenzin, former Deputy Secretary in the TAR Chinese Communist Party (TAR CCP); Ragdi, Deputy Secretary in the TAR CCP; Passang, Deputy Secretary in the TAR CCP; and Dorjee Tseten, another former Chairman of the TAR government. The Panchen Lama's death prevented what probably would have been a very difficult relationship with the second most powerful monk in Tibetan society. (As President of China, Hu will be responsible for the fate of the current Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, assumed to be detained outside of Beijing.)

So far, Hu Jintao's public remarks on Tibet and the Dalai Lama, have not departed from official rhetoric. On July 19, 2001 in Lhasa, Hu gave a major policy speech at the 50th anniversary celebration of China's "peaceful liberation of Tibet," where he said, "It is essential to fight unequivocally against the separatist activities by the Dalai clique and anti-China forces in the world..."

Nonetheless, on March 7, 2002, Lodi Gyari, Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his designated lead interlocutor for dialogue with China, told a congressional hearing that it is a positive factor that Hu Jintao knows conditions in Tibet from first-hand experience. Hu's most recent public statement concerning negotiations with the Dalai Lama was during the November 2001 Berlin press conference. Hu said his government was willing to "negotiate with the Dalai Lama when he declares Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable parts of China." This is a stock formulation. However, the vitriolic language of some Chinese leaders is absent, which is consistent with Hu's low-profile style, and may foreshadow a more reasonable approach.